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We incorporate the process of policy diffusion (i.e. the uncoordinated dissemination of 
policies among countries) into a probabilistic two-country-model of strategic environ-
mental policy. Contrary to the usual setting with simultaneous decision making we con-
sider the impact of sequential decision making: In the first step the domestic government 
introduces an emission tax, in the second step policy diffusion occurs with a certain prob-
ability and in the third step the firms decide on output quantities. Within this framework 
we analyze how the prospect of policy diffusion, motivated by a higher damage parame-
ter in the domestic country, influences the optimal domestic emission tax. We show that 
if the damage parameter in the foreign country is sufficiently high policy diffusion will 
occur which leads to higher tax rates and higher welfare compared to the equilibrium re-
sulting from simultaneous decision making. Moreover, we show that an increase in the 
domestic tax rate also increases the probability that the foreign country adopts the tax pol-
icy. 
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11    Introduction 
 
Non-cooperative behavior is a recurring theme whenever the internalization of negative envi-
ronmental externalities is analyzed in a setting with more than one country. For instance, stra-
tegic environmental policy games show that the resulting Nash-equilibrium usually is charac-
terized by a trade-off between the firms’ rent-seeking motive and the reduction in environ-
mental harm which regularly leads to ecological dumping (RAUSCHER 2005). The latter im-
plies a downward adjustment of the instruments’ strength, e.g. the rate of an emission tax, un-
til the according reaction functions intersect. That is, the governments’ decisions regarding 
the instruments’ respective strength are strategic substitutes. This result, in turn, is the conse-
quence of the inherent disincentive of the governments to precommit to their regulatory deci-
sion in a game of simultaneous decision-making. 
In principle, the interdependency underlying strategic environmental policy models cap-
tures the reaction of one government upon the policy decision of its counterpart. These multi-
stage games, which basically are a modification of the classic strategic trade models (SPEN-
CER & BRANDER 1983, BRANDER & SPENCER 1985), consider the above described non-
cooperative decisions about the respective strength of environmental policies in different set-
ups. The latter comprise analyses of the interdependencies of emission taxes and subsidies 
(CONRAD 1993), varying configurations of competition and market structure (BARRETT 1994), 
the impact of emission-reducing R&D expenditures (SIMPSON & BRADFORD 1996, ULPH & 
ULPH 1996) or the inclusion of an environmental service sector (FEESS & MUEHLHEUSSER 
2002). However, Bárcena-Ruiz (2006) shows that simultaneous decision making is not the on-
ly possible setup: countries may move sequentially due to the impact of transboundary pollu-
tion. If pollution spillovers are sufficiently low emission taxes are strategic complements due 
to the pollution shifting effect known from Kennedy (1994), that is a country has an incentive 
2to shift production to another country to avoid environmental damage. Consequently, emis-
sion taxes and social welfare are higher compared the standard simultaneous decision making 
setting. In case of high emission spillovers, this incentive diminishes and emission taxes may 
become strategic substitutes. 
Our model follows this idea but leaves aside the pollution shifting effect to find another ra-
tionale that explains the possibility of a gradual spread of policies among countries and how 
this spread influences the governments’ regulation schedules and their attitude towards acting 
as a leader. A swift glance at the real world of environmental policy making shows that poli-
cies employed elsewhere may indeed be adopted by second-movers. One example is the grad-
ual spread of CO2/energy-taxes as can be seen from table 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The international spread of CO2 and energy taxes 
 
Hence, we ask, if policy adoption is a systemic determinant of policy making, whether this 
issue can be implemented into the context of strategic environmental policy. To begin with, a 
review of the literature on the topic of policy convergence ultimately provides three explana-
tions for the spread of policies (ELKINS & SIMMONS 2005): (1) policy makers respond similar-
                                                 
1  The first carbon/energy tax was implemented in Finland in 1990. Since then further countries have intro-
duced similar regulatory measures. This process was neither the result of harmonization nor of imposition but an 
outcome of policy diffusion (OECD 2001, BUSCH & JÖRGENS 2005). Note that we only listed those taxes that 
explicitly aim at curtailing CO2-emissions, that is, many more countries have implemented taxes, mainly out of 
fiscal motives, on e.g. electricity or fuels. 
Country Year of introduction Country Year of introduction 
 
Finland  1990 Boulder, Colorado (USA) 2006 
Norway 1991 Alberta (Canada) 2007 
Sweden 1991 Quebec (Canada) 2007 
Denmark 1992 British Columbia (Canada) 2008 
Netherlands 1992 San Francisco Bay Area (USA) 2008 
Belgium 1993 Switzerland 2008 
Austria 1996 Ireland 2010 
Slovenia 1997 Montgomery County, Maryland (USA) 2010 
Costa Rica 1997 India 2010 
Italy 1998 South Africa 2010 
Germany 1999 Australia 2012 
United Kingdom 2001 Taiwan (under debate)  
3ly to similar conditions in an independent and uncoordinated way; (2) the propagation of poli-
cies ensues from an interdependent and coordinated process which may involve either harmo-
nization or imposition; (3) policy makers decide uncoordinatedly but in doing so they consid-
er their counterparts’ choices. The third explanation, which has also been dubbed “uncoordi-
nated interdependence” (ELKINS & SIMMONS 2005, p. 35), refers to the diffusion of policies. 
According to the majority of scholars we view policy diffusion as the process by which a po-
litical innovation – like the introduction of a novel emission tax – disseminates over time 
among countries (ROGERS 2003). This implies that at least one country has to act as a first-
mover in terms of policy making. The choice of the first-mover is then expected to alter the 
probability of further policy adoptions (STRANG 1991). These notions can be readily translat-
ed into a non-cooperative Cournot-game in which a government sets an emission tax under 
consideration of the other player’s decision.  
We show that the crucial parameter governing the decision of a country to play leader in 
terms of setting a higher tax rate is the damage parameter. The motivation for playing leader 
therefore is a higher damage parameter which may result from (1) a higher vulnerability of the 
environment, (2) a higher aggregated demand for a sound environment or (3) a politico-
economic constellation that is favorable for installing green policies. Accordingly, we can an-
alyze how the prospect of policy diffusion affects the decisions of a government concerning 
the setting of an optimal emission tax. The higher the domestic government sets its emission 
tax rate the higher the probability is that the foreign government adopts this policy. Nonethe-
less, our simple model is not meant to give a detailed account on the determinants of policy 
diffusion. By focusing on the damage parameter we rather aim at investigating one motivation 
that may explain its emergence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model 
and in section 3 we analyze the equilibrium domestic tax rate in the case of an exogenously 
4given probability of policy diffusion. In section 4 we then compare the results of our Stackel-
berg-setting with the conventional simultaneous non-cooperative game. In section 5 we dis-
cuss the determinants of policy diffusion and analyze the resulting impact on the optimal do-
mestic tax rate. Finally, in section 6 we summarize the main conclusions of our model. 
 
 
2   The Model 
 
Consider a simple model with one domestic firm indexed by d and one foreign firm indexed 
by f. Both firms produce a homogenous good which they sell on a third country’s market. The 
latter assumption, which allows for omitting consumer surplus in calculating welfare levels, is 
standard in models of strategic environmental policy that focus on rent-seeking aspects (e.g. 
CONRAD 1993 and SIMPSON & BRADFORD 1996). Inverse market demand is linear and down-
ward sloping, i.e. p=a−(yd+yf) where jy  (j=d,f) denotes the output of firm j which results 
from Cournot quantity competition. For simplicity, production costs are neglected, but it is as-
sumed that each unit of output leads to one unit of a pollutant which is harmful to the envi-
ronment of the respective country. Environmental damages are given by a quadratic damage 
function 2jjj eD   with emissions ej equal to output yj. In order to motivate the domestic gov-
ernment’s role as a first-mover in environmental policy we assume that the domestic damage 
parameter is higher than its foreign counterpart )( fd   . This difference between the dam-
age parameters can either be due to a higher domestic preference for environmental quality or 
to a more vulnerable domestic environment. 
The game under consideration consists of three stages. In the first stage the domestic gov-
ernment introduces an emission tax td which may initiate a process of policy diffusion. In the 
5second stage policy diffusion occurs with a probability of ]1,0∈ [  which prompts the for-
eign government to introduce an emission tax tf. Without policy diffusion − i.e. with a proba-
bility (1− ) − no foreign emission tax emerges. In the third stage the firms choose their out-
put level given the governments’ decisions from the first and the second stage.  
In order to avoid confusion, it should carefully be noted that   has to be interpreted within 
the context of our model as a subjective probability resulting from the judgment of the domes-
tic government about how likely policy diffusion is to occur. To begin with we treat   as ex-
ogenous. However, in section 5 we will discuss the determinants of   from the viewpoint of 
the domestic government and analyze the resulting impacts.  
As usual in models of strategic environmental policy, both governments aim at maximizing 
national welfare which is given by the firms’ profits plus tax revenues net of environmental 
damages. However, in contrast to the simultaneous decision making approach usually em-
ployed in such models (e.g. SIMPSON & BRADFORD 1996), the sequence of decisions described 
above focuses on the process of policy diffusion and therefore establishes a Stackelberg-
relationship between the two governments: Provided that policy diffusion occurs the optimal 
foreign tax rate tf depends on the domestic tax rate td. Hence, we can derive a reaction func-
tion tf(td) which has to be accounted for by the domestic government in stage one of the game. 
Before we proceed to analyze the equilibrium it should be noted that the above Stackel-
berg-framework requires that the domestic government is able to commit to its initial decision 
on the tax rate. At least in the short- and medium-term, however, such a commitment is al-
ready guaranteed by the nature of the political process because changing an already estab-
lished emission tax requires a time-consuming legislative process. Moreover, unpredictable 
changes in environmental policy are not desirable in terms of providing planning reliability 
for the affected firms. 
 
63   Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
 
Due to the sequence described above, the model can be solved by backwards induction. In the 
third stage, profit maximization by the firms leads to the output levels 
3/]2[),( dffd
P
d ttatty   and 3/]2[),( fdfdPf ttatty   in the case with policy diffusion 
(see Appendix A.1).2 Analogously, we obtain for the case without policy diffusion 
3/]2[)( dd
N
d taty   and 3/][)( ddNf taty  . Re-inserting these results into the firms’ objec-
tive functions ),()(),( fd
i
jjfd
i
j ttytptt   yields the according profit levels of the firms 
2),(),( fd
i
jfd
i
j ttytt   for j=d,f and i=P,N.  
In the second stage, the foreign welfare function for the case with policy diffusion is given 
by .),(),(),(),( 2fd
P
fffd
P
fffd
P
ffdf ttyttytttttw    Maximizing this expression with re-
spect to tf leads to the following reaction function: 
(1) 
)21(4
)14)((
)(
f
fd
df
ta
tt 


 . 
As shown by (1), a positive foreign tax rate requires γf>1/4. The explanation for this result is 
straightforward since there are two opposite incentives for the government: On the one hand, 
granting a subsidy per unit of output or emissions will increase welfare by increasing the for-
eign firm’s profits for an amount that is higher than the subsidy itself; on the other hand, 
charging a tax per unit of output or emissions will increase welfare by decreasing environ-
mental damages. Consequently, to arrive at a positive tax rate on balance, the latter incentive 
has to outweigh the former one. This, in turn, requires that the damage parameter γ is suffi-
ciently large. Of course, this rationale also applies for the domestic government. In the fol-
                                                 
2  We use the superscripts “P” and “N” to indicate the case with and the case without policy diffusion. All 
calculations have been done using Mathematica version 5.2. The program file is available from the authors on 
request. 
7lowing we will assume that both damage parameters satisfy the condition for a positive tax 
rate, i.e. γj>1/4 for j=d,f. Under this assumption, we obtain 0tt df   from (1), i.e. the two 
tax rates are strategic complements.  
By inserting the reaction function (1) into the above results for ),( fd
P
j tty we can express 
the output levels in the case with policy diffusion solely in terms of the domestic tax rate td, 
where the according profit levels are again given by 2)()( d
P
jd
P
j tyt  : 
(2) 
)21(4
)43()41(
)(
f
fdf
d
P
d
ta
ty 


 ,       
(3) 
)21(2
)(
f
d
d
P
f
taty 
 .        
Now we turn to the first stage where the domestic government introduces the tax rate dt  
which may trigger the process of policy diffusion. For simplicity, we assume that the domes-
tic government behaves risk neutral and aims at maximizing expected welfare which is given 
by )()1()()(~ d
N
dd
P
ddd twtwtw    with 22 )()()()( didddidddiddid tytyttytw   for i=P,N. 
Accounting for the above results concerning output and profit levels, maximization of ex-
pected welfare leads to the following domestic tax rate: 
(4) 
])[())(1(
])[())((
5284171421232
48511421148
2
2


fdfdffd
fdfdffd
d
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t 

. 
In interpreting dt  we start with the extreme case of 0 . Under this condition (4) reduces to 
)8/()( 4140 ddd at   . This expression represents the optimal solution in the case of a 
pure national emission tax that is unbiased by any prospect of policy diffusion. Due to γd>1/4 
we obtain 00  dt . Hence, the positive welfare effects of reduced emissions always out-
8weigh the negative effects of reduced output such that the introduction of dt  pays even if 
there is no chance for policy diffusion.  
For the general case with 10   we obtain 0/   dt  as shown in Appendix A.2.3 Con-
sequently, other things equal the optimal domestic tax rate is the higher the higher the proba-
bility of policy diffusion σ is. This result is not surprising since an increase in the probability 
of policy diffusion decreases the expected loss in profits caused by taxing emissions. Moreo-
ver, since the domestic and the foreign tax rates are strategic complements, we can conclude 
that any effect that leads to a higher domestic tax rate dt  will also increase the foreign tax rate 

ft  to be introduced in the case of policy diffusion. The latter can be calculated from inserting 

dt  into reaction function (1). 
Next, we analyze how variations in the probability of policy diffusion will affect domestic 
welfare in equilibrium. In doing so, we have to distinguish between an ex ante and an ex post 
perspective. In the ex ante perspective it is not clear whether policy diffusion will occur in the 
end such that the relevant magnitude is expected welfare )(~ dd tw ; in the ex post perspective 
policy diffusion has occurred or has not occurred, such that the resulting welfare level )( d
P
d tw  
or )( d
N
d tw  has to be considered. Obviously, ex post an increase in σ  will lead to an increase 
in welfare if policy diffusion occurs and to a decrease in welfare if policy diffusion does not 
occur, i.e. 0/)(   dPd tw  and 0/)(   dNd tw . The reason for this is straightforward: If 
policy diffusion finally does not occur, the difference between the tax rate actually chosen and 
the ex post optimal tax rate 0
 dt , will, other things equal, be the higher the higher  is. 
However, if policy diffusion finally does occur, the difference between the tax rate actually 
                                                 
3  Note that 00  dt  and 0/   dt  implies that dt  is always strictly positive for γj>1/4 and ].1,0[   
9chosen and the ex post optimal tax rate 1
 dt will, other things equal, be the smaller the high-
er   is. 
In the ex ante perspective an increase in   has two opposite effects on expected welfare: 
On the one hand, )( d
P
d tw  increases, on the other hand, )()1( *dNd tw  decreases. However, as 
shown in Appendix A.2, on balance an increase in the probability of policy diffusion will al-
ways lead to an increase in expected welfare in equilibrium.  
 
 
4   First-Mover Behavior vs. Simultaneous Decision Making 
 
In order to explore the implications of first-mover behavior by the domestic government, it is 
also instructive to compare the above results with the results of a standard model of strategic 
environmental policy where both governments fix their emission taxes simultaneously. For 
reasons of consistency, we restrict the analysis to the case with probability 1  and omit the 
second stage of the game described above. In order to distinguish the according outcome from 
the results derived in the last section, we use upper case letters for the case of simultaneous 
decision making. In the second stage of the now modified game, the tax rates Td and Tf are al-
ready given and the firms simultaneously choose their output levels. This leads to output lev-
els 32 /][),( dffdd TTTTY a   and 32 /][),( fdfdf TTTTY a   with the according profit lev-
els 2),(),( fdjfdj TTYTT   for j=d,f. In the first stage of the game, both governments simulta-
neously maximize the welfare function 2),(),(),(),( fdjjfdjjfdjfdj TTYTTYTTTTTW   
for j=d,f. The resulting reaction functions can be solved for the following tax rates: 
(5) 
)43(4125
)41)(14(
fdf
fd
d
a
T 


 ,    
)43(4125
)41)(14(
fdf
df
f
a
T 


 . 
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In contrast, in the Stackelberg setup, following from (3), first-mover behavior by the domestic 
government implies for the case of 1 : 
(6) 
)]1(431)[43(
]1)43()[41(
dfdf
fdf
d
a
t 


     
By inserting this into the reaction function (1) we obtain for the according foreign tax rate: 
(7) 
)]1(431)[43(2
)]86(41)[14(
dfdf
fdff
f
a
t 


 . 
Comparing (5) with (6) and (7) respectively, it is easy to show that first mover behavior by 
the domestic government implies higher tax rates compared to the Nash-equilibrium resulting 
from simultaneous decision making for both countries, i.e.   dd Tt  and   ff Tt  (see Appendix 
A.3). Hence, the domestic government exploits its first mover advantage in order to fix a 
higher tax rate. Moreover, both countries attain a higher level of welfare compared to the case 
of simultaneous decision making. Consequently, first mover behavior that is accompanied by 
policy diffusion leads to a Pareto-improvement (see Appendix A.3) and accordingly prevents 
a tax race to the bottom.  
In the next section we turn back to our original model where policy diffusion occurs with 
probability  . But now we will discuss the determinants of σ  from the viewpoint of the do-
mestic government and analyze the resulting impacts on the optimal domestic tax rate.  
 
 
5   Determinants of Policy Diffusion 
 
Since adopting the domestic tax rate leads to a higher foreign welfare level the domestic gov-
ernment could assume a probability of 1. Hence, the commitment of the domestic government 
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signals its foreign counterpart that taxing emissions will not harm foreign industry profits as 
long as γf >1/4. However, different impediments towards adoption like the lack of foreign in-
stitutional capabilities may arise. Overcoming such impediments is more probable the higher 
the gains from establishing an emission tax are. Hence, from the viewpoint of the domestic 
government it seems to be rational to assume that the probability of policy diffusion is other 
things equal the higher, the larger the foreign difference in welfare between the cases with and 
without policy diffusion is. For the case without policy diffusion the foreign welfare level as a 
function of td is given by 2)()1()( d
N
ffd
N
f tytw  . Inserting )( dNf ty  as calculated in Section 
3 yields: 
 (8) 
9
)1()(
)(
2
fd
d
N
f
ta
tw
 . 
For the case with policy diffusion the foreign welfare level as a function of td is given by 
)()()()1()( 2 d
P
fdfd
P
ffd
P
f tytttytw   . Inserting )t(t df  according to (1) and )( dPf ty  ac-
cording to (3) yields: 
(9) 
)21(8
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2
f
d
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f
tatw 
 . 
Finally, calculating the difference between both welfare levels we arrive at: 
(10) 
)21(72
)14()(
)()()(ˆ
22
f
fd
d
N
fd
P
fdf
ta
twtwtw 


 . 
As indicated by (10), the difference in foreign welfare is, other things equal, the higher, the 
higher the domestic tax rate td is. Consequently, increasing td  leads to an increase in the prob-
ability of policy diffusion. Moreover, foreign welfare also increases in the foreign damage pa-
rameter if γf >1/4. So again, environmental damage in the foreign country must be sufficiently 
high to make policy diffusion plausible. 
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Although our model is too complex to allow for an explicit backwards solution with an en-
dogenous probability of policy diffusion, the above result yields some interesting insights 
concerning the relationship between optimal first-mover behavior and policy diffusion. First, 
the merits of models with simultaneous decision making notwithstanding actual patterns of 
the spread of environmental policies show that the introduction of regulatory instruments usu-
ally happens sequentially. Hence, our model provides a starting point for the analysis of an 
empirical phenomenon. Second, it is shown that playing first-mover does not trigger a non-
cooperative reaction as long as the foreign government has an incentive to reduce emissions. 
This, in turn, is ensured by a sufficiently high damage parameter. Thus, if an environmental 
problem is substantial a country considering acting as a first mover in terms of setting an 
emission tax does not necessarily need to fear ecological dumping. Third, the more ambitious 
the domestic government acts in terms of fixing the tax rate the higher the probability of poli-
cy diffusion becomes. Thus, although a non-cooperative setting has been utilized the early 
commitment of the domestic government leads to an equilibrium which is Pareto-superior to 
non-cooperative simultaneous decision-making. Acting as a first mover is therefore a strong 
signal for more reluctant governments to overcome their doubt and reevaluate their approach 
to implementing an environmental policy. 
 
 
6   Summary and Conclusions 
 
Policy diffusion describes the process by which a political innovation – like the introduction 
of a novel emission tax – disseminates over time among countries. This implies that at least 
one country has to act as a first-mover in terms of policy making. The choice of the first-
mover is then expected to alter the probability of further policy adoptions. In order to analyze 
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this issue from an economic point of view we have developed a simple two-country-model in 
which emissions are taxed in the presence of (possible) policy diffusion. Contrary to the usual 
approach of simultaneous decisions on tax rates we consider a Stackelberg game: In the first 
step the domestic government introduces an emission tax td thus acting as Stackelberg-leader, 
in the second step the foreign government decides whether or not to introduce an emission tax 
tf and in the third step the firms decide on their output quantities to be sold on a third coun-
try’s market. For the case of an exogenous probability of policy diffusion we show that the 
optimal domestic tax rate is, other things equal, the higher the higher the probability of adop-
tion is. Next, we demonstrate that this probability is determined by the increase in foreign 
welfare that follows from taxing emissions. Due to the domestic government’s commitment to 
the introduction of an emission tax the foreign government can only gain by adopting the reg-
ulatory policy (as long as the foreign damage parameter is sufficiently high). Moreover, we 
show that first-mover behaviour by the domestic government leads to a higher tax rate com-
pared to the Nash solution with simultaneous decisions on tax rates. 
To be sure, our analysis of policy diffusion in a strategic trade setting is not meant to be an 
exhaustive treatment of this issue. Rather, its objective is to introduce an empirically relevant 
topic into an established theoretical framework of environmental policy making. Obviously, 
modelling the foreign government’s policy choice as a reaction to the decision of its domestic 
counterpart obviates the standard assumptions about the actors’ optimising behaviour in a typ-
ical strategic environmental policy game. At first glance, our setup involves a rather servile 
foreign government which may be a disquieting proposition in an analysis of welfare-
maximising behaviour. However, the simple decision rule of the foreign government is a 
proxy for more complex considerations that may also serve as starting points for future re-
search: First, the simple decision rule may reflect economizing on scarce political and admin-
istrative resources in the sense that imitating an existing policy is the consequence from cost-
14
minimising behaviour. Second, the rule may stand for the existence of substantial costs of 
learning about the policy innovation. This implies ex ante imperfect information about possi-
ble policy innovations which allows for the emergence of a first-mover. Third, the rule may 
capture the issue of heterogeneous stocks of experience and knowledge about policy making 
which also allows for first-mover behaviour. Finally, future research can also analyze a multi-
period setup in which the domestic government is able to revaluate its initial decision after the 
foreign government adopted the tax or not. Thus, these examples represent other determinants 
of policy diffusion and their analysis may further improve our understanding of the implica-
tions of policy diffusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A.1  Determination of quantities in equilibrium 
 
Profit maximization by the domestic firm implies: 
 
(A1) Max! dddfdd ytyyya  ][     →   ][5.0 dfd tyay  .  
 
Analogously, profit maximization by the foreign firm implies: 
 
(A2) Max ! ffffdf ytyyya   ][   →  ][5.0 fdf tyay  , 
 
where φ is a dummy variable associated with the foreign tax rate, i.e., we use φ=1 for the case 
with policy diffusion and φ=0 for the case without policy diffusion, respectively. Solving 
(A1) and (A2) for the equilibrium yields: 
 
(A3) ]2)[31( dfd ttay   , 
(A4) ]2)[31( fdf ttay  . 
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A.2  Proof for 0/   dt  and 0/)(~   dd tw  
 
Differentiating dt  with respect to σ  and rearranging terms yields: 
 
(A5) ))))]43(414(4(1)(14()21[(72 2 fdfdfffd
at  
   
 
with 0])21)(21(32)541728)(14([ 22  fdfdfdf  . Due to γf>1/4 we 
obtain 0/   dt  from (A5). Moreover, to see that an increase in σ  always leads to an in-
crease in expected welfare in equilibrium, note that the latter can be written as )),((~  dd tw . 
Hence, we obtain: 
 
(A6) 






 


d
d
dddd t
t
wwtw ~~)),((~ . 
 
Due to the first order condition 0/~   dd tw , equation (A6) reduces to the direct effect 
  /~dw  which is always positive.  
 
 
A.3  Proof for   jj Tt  and Pareto-improvement 
 
Calculating the difference   ddd Ttt  and   fff Ttt  from (5), (6) and (7) yields the fol-
lowing expressions which are always positive due to γj>1/4: 
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Moreover, the resulting welfare levels for the case of first-mover behavior by the domestic 
government ( jw ) as well as for the case of simultaneous decision making ( jW ) can be calcu-
lated as: 
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Calculating the differences   ddd Www  and   fff Www  and accounting for γf>1/4 
shows that first-mover behavior leads to a Pareto improvement compared to the Nash equilib-
rium with simultaneous decision making: 
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